The recent chapter of Phoenix Suns basketball, which largely concluded last month with the trade of Kevin Durant to the Houston Rockets, officially drew to a close on Wednesday. This finality came as the franchise bought out the remaining portion of Bradley Beal`s contract, merely two seasons after his acquisition.
In 2023, the Suns harbored significant ambitions. Under new, assertive owner Mat Ishbia, the team swiftly executed major trades to acquire Kevin Durant and Bradley Beal, who collectively boasted 16 All-Star selections. The cost for Beal`s contract appeared modest at the time, primarily because his rare no-trade clause allowed him to choose his destination, and the Washington Wizards prioritized offloading his future salary commitments over securing a substantial return.
However, the star trio of Durant, Beal, and the existing cornerstone Devin Booker never truly harmonized. Despite their massive investment, the Suns managed to win only one playoff series during this period – a first-round triumph against the LA Clippers in 2023, notably before Beal joined the team. With Beal on the roster, Phoenix failed to win a single playoff game, experiencing a first-round sweep by the Minnesota Timberwolves in 2024 and missing the playoffs entirely in 2025.
This star-studded era has now abruptly ended: Durant is a Rocket, and Beal is set to become a Clipper, having agreed to a two-year deal post-buyout on Wednesday. Devin Booker is once again the sole star for the Suns, mirroring his status in 2020 before the franchise acquired Chris Paul and subsequently reached the 2021 NBA Finals.
As this partnership dissolves, it`s worth reflecting on this ill-fated period – one that promised much hope and bold aspirations but delivered minimal tangible success on the court. Below are the four principal factors contributing to the Suns` recent decline:
1. Disappointing On-Court Performance
The primary issue for the Suns was player availability; the secondary problem was their mediocrity, even when all three star players were healthy and on the court together. Predominantly due to injuries – particularly to Beal, who hasn`t played more than 53 games in a season since 2020-21 – the acclaimed trio shared the floor for a mere 78 regular-season games and four playoff games over two seasons. In these contests, their record was 45-37. To put this in perspective, a 45-37 record would have ranked ninth in the Western Conference last season and eleventh the season prior. This suggests that even at full strength, the Suns resembled a lower-tier play-in team rather than a genuine championship contender.
Cumulatively, with their three stars, the Suns posted an 85-79 regular-season record and an 0-4 playoff record, resulting in an overall 85-83 combined performance. They were outscored by a net 55 points (+5 in the regular season, -60 in the playoffs); among all teams over the past two seasons, only the Miami Heat had a more balanced point differential.
Simply put, when Booker, Durant, and Beal were all available, the Suns were, effectively, one of the NBA`s most average teams – a stark contrast to the elite performance their exorbitant payroll should have delivered.
2. Lack of Synergy Among Superstars
The most effective superstar combinations in the NBA feature players whose diverse skill sets complement one another, creating a collective output that surpasses their individual contributions. Consider how Kevin Garnett anchored the defense for Paul Pierce and Ray Allen, or how Stephen Curry and Draymond Green consistently elevate each other within the pick-and-roll.
The rationale behind acquiring Beal was that he would propel the Suns` offense to unprecedented levels when alongside Booker and Durant, and also sustain the team`s performance when those primary stars rested. In practice, neither outcome materialized. Phoenix`s stars struggled to complement each other because their skill sets largely overlapped, failing to introduce new dimensions to the team.
PBP Stats indicate that over the past two regular seasons, when Booker and Durant played without Beal, the Suns averaged 120.5 points per 100 possessions. Strikingly, when Beal joined this duo, their offensive rating remained precisely the same at 120.5. This suggests Beal had no discernible positive offensive impact when playing alongside Phoenix`s two leading stars, and furthermore, the team`s defense actually deteriorated with him on the court.
Furthermore, lineups featuring only Booker performed better than those with both Booker and Beal, and similarly, lineups with just Durant were more effective than those with Durant and Beal. When Beal played without either Booker or Durant, the team`s offensive production dropped to just 111.5 points per 100 possessions, which is comparable to a bottom-10 NBA offense.
| Lineups | Off. Rating (points per 100 possessions) |
|---|---|
| Booker, Durant, Beal | 120.5 |
| Booker, Durant | 120.5 |
| Booker | 118.2 |
| Booker, Beal | 113.4 |
| Durant | 119.8 |
| Durant, Beal | 113.4 |
| Beal | 111.5 |
(These statistics raise skepticism about Beal`s suitability as a replacement for Norman Powell on the Clippers. If he couldn`t be a difference-maker alongside Booker and Durant, can he truly impact a team featuring James Harden and Kawhi Leonard?)
While his usage rate decreased from 32% during his final three seasons in Washington to 22% in Phoenix, Beal`s individual statistics as a Sun appeared respectable on the surface. He averaged 17.6 points per game with good efficiency, including shooting 41% from beyond the arc.
However, these points ultimately proved to be “empty calories,” failing to elevate the Suns` competitive standing in the increasingly challenging Western Conference. By this metric, his addition would have been underwhelming even without considering the significant financial constraints his contract imposed on the franchise.
3. Excessive Financial Outlay
Backed by Mat Ishbia`s enthusiastic commitment, the Suns topped the league in total payroll over the last two seasons. An analysis of Spotrac data indicates Phoenix spent a staggering $626 million on player salaries and luxury tax payments. This figure was $51 million more than the second-highest spender, the Golden State Warriors. Moreover, this calculation doesn`t even account for the non-financial penalties the Suns incurred under the league`s new salary cap regulations for exceeding the second apron.
What`s even more striking is the minimal success achieved despite this enormous expenditure. Among the top 11 highest-spending teams over the past two campaigns, every other team secured at least one playoff victory – except for the Suns. Phoenix`s spending was almost double that of the next team that failed to win a playoff game; the New Orleans Pelicans, for instance, spent $336 million, a full $290 million less than the Suns.
Typically, the league`s highest-spending teams see a return on their investment, as increased roster expenditure usually correlates with more wins, and losing teams are disincentivized from incurring hefty luxury tax penalties. However, as illustrated by the accompanying graph comparing spending over the past two seasons to playoff wins, Phoenix`s situation is a stark anomaly.
4. Catastrophic Trade Decisions
In their pursuit of a championship with Booker, Durant, and Beal, the Suns committed not only financially but also strategically, lavishly spending their most valuable trade currency – draft picks – in an ambitious attempt to assemble a superteam.
To secure Durant and Beal, the Suns collectively relinquished five first-round draft picks, five pick swaps, Mikal Bridges, Cameron Johnson, and Chris Paul. Intriguingly, these three players later yielded an additional seven first-round picks and a swap when their subsequent teams traded them away.
Compiling these assets, it appears the Suns effectively valued Durant and Beal at the staggering cost of 12 first-round picks and six swaps. Consequently, the team currently possesses no control over their own first-round picks until 2032. (While this valuation might be slightly exaggerated, given that, for instance, Mikal Bridges was unlikely to be worth five first-round picks by himself in 2023 – though the New York Knicks later paid that price – and the Wizards and Brooklyn Nets absorbed significant contracts when trading Paul and Johnson, impacting their pick returns; nonetheless, the cumulative expenditure for Durant and Beal remains astonishing.)
“We make those decisions 100 out of 100 times, not 99 out of 100, but 100 out of 100,” Ishbia stated to Baxter Holmes last year. “And we would do them again. I believe the other 29 GMs would all do the exact same thing.”
However, when the Suns parted ways with Durant and Beal this summer, their return amounted to just one first-round pick (used to select center Khaman Maluach at No. 10 overall), Jalen Green, Dillon Brooks, and a minor degree of financial maneuverability.
The current outcome is a team with limited talent beyond Devin Booker, virtually no future assets, and the lingering debris of its recent, failed endeavors.
Only three years prior, the Suns held a commanding 2-0 lead in the NBA Finals, just two victories shy of clinching the franchise`s inaugural championship.
Today, they potentially face the bleakest long-term prospects across the entire league.
